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Abstract 
Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain the spatial patterning of service 
accessibility. The bureaucratic hypothesis holds that spatial inequalities are 
unpatterned and result from the application of decisions rules, while the competing 
political hypothesis suggests that politically-motivated decision making results in 
discriminatory outcomes. We use the example of the centralization of service 
provision in remote Indigenous communities in Australia’s Northern Territory to 
show that these hypotheses may in fact be complementary. In recent years, 
government rhetoric about Australia’s remote Indigenous communities has moved 
to focus on economic viability instead of social justice. One policy realization of this 
rhetoric has been the designation of ‘growth towns’ and ‘priority communities’ to 
act as service hubs for surrounding communities. The introduction of such hubs 
was examined and substantial inequality in access to service hubs was found. 
Inequality and overall system efficiency could be reduced with by optimizing the 
selection of hubs but the imposition of any hub-and-spoke mode in the study area 
was associated with racially-patterned patterned inequality of access. We conclude 
that when policy contexts are politically motivated, the application of racially-blind 
decision rules may result in racially-discriminatory spatial inequalities. 
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Equity, discrimination and remote policy: Investigating the 
centralization of remote service delivery in the Northern Territory 
 
1. Introduction 
Provision of public services is one of the fundamental roles of contemporary 
governments. However, whenever allocative decisions are made questions of equity 
inevitably arise. A vast literature documenting the spatial inequity of service 
provision has proliferated over recent years.  One branch of literature is concerned 
with identifying locations that are underserviced so that resources can be directed 
appropriately. For example, Coffee et al. (2012) developed an index of access to 
cardiac services in Australia, finding that 14% of localities have poor access to 
relevant health services, suggesting an increased risk of mortality from 
cardiovascular diseases for residents of those areas. A similar logic underlies an 
immense set of studies in the domains of access to health services (for a review, see 
Rosenberg, 2014) and other services such as food retailing (McEntee & Agyeman, 
2010) or high-speed internet access (Riddlesden & Singleton, 2014). 
The geographic accessibility of services and amenities is important because 
accessibility may potentially impact on service use and thereby outcomes. Studies 
of the association between accessibility and health outcomes generally find mixed 
results. A recent meta-analysis of the relationship between access to greenspace 
and obesity found that most studies reported a weak correlation between health 
outcomes and greenspace accessibility, although results were inconsistent 
(Lachowycz & Jones, 2011).  In one typical study of health service accessibility, 
Astell-Burt et al. (2012) found that for people diagnosed with hepatitis C, those 
living further from a specialist treatment center were less likely to be referred. For 
those who were referred, however, travel distance to treatment was not correlated 
with non-attendance or loss to follow-up. Similarly, Wan et al. (2012) found that 
while access to oncologists was related to cancer survival in rural Texas, 
accessibility was not a salient factor in urban Texas. While the specific results in 
this vast literature vary among service types, outcome variables and study areas, 
the cumulative evidence suggests that service accessibility frequently impacts on 
outcomes in ways that are sometimes minor but often policy relevant. 
Service accessibility thus becomes an issue of social and indeed spatial 
justice (Rosenberg, 2014). When inequalities of access exist and when accessibility 
influences outcomes, questions of ‘who gets what, where and how’ (Smith, 1974) 
take on a new urgency. Indeed, many studies have found that access to services is 
correlated with socio-economic advantage and race. For  example, Hilmers et al. 
(2012) review of 24 studies found generally greater levels of neighborhood 
accessibility to unhealthy food outlets in deprived neighborhoods or neighborhoods 
with a greater proportion of residents from an ethnic minority. In Auckland, New 
Zealand, Sanders et al. (2013) found that the provision of private musculoskeletal 
clinics was concentrated in ethnically European neighborhoods, but that the 
provision of publicly-funded general practitioners was not racially patterned. 
Similarly, a national county-level analysis of the distribution of physician 
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assistants and medical doctors in the United States found that levels of provision 
were greater in counties with a greater proportion of white, non-Hispanic residents 
(Shaffer & Zolnik, 2014). What these exemplary studies reveal is that the 
accessibility of services that affect people’s life chances is frequently distributed in 
racially and socially patterned ways.  
Given that the geography of service delivery impacts on outcomes, questions 
should be raised about why such discriminatory spatial patterning exists. While 
this question has received relatively little attention in the geographic accessibility 
literature, it became a key issue among urban policy scholars following a 
Washington DC court finding the presence of discrimination in the distribution of 
school funding in 1967 (Oakley & Logan, 2007). While most scholars have 
confirmed the existence of some degree of inequity in the distribution of urban 
services, the cause of misallocation has been the subject of much attention. 
Animating this debate has been an effort to discover whether discrimination—direct 
or indirect—has resulted in ethnic minorities or other disadvantaged groups 
receiving diminished access to services relative to the rest of the community.  
Two competing hypotheses have been proposed to explain the creation and 
persistence of spatial inequity in service delivery. First, a political hypothesis has 
been proposed, in which elected officials misallocate services in order to ensure the 
loyalty of their voter base (e.g. Cingranelli, 1981). Alternatively phrased, the 
political hypothesis predicts that when it comes to service distribution ‘some 
groups suffer because of their race, because of their social status or because of 
their paucity of political power’ (Lineberry, 1977, p. 12).  If this hypothesis holds, 
we should expect to find disadvantaged groups having relatively low levels of access 
to services. 
The second hypothesis asserts that service allocation is largely a 
bureaucratic rather than political function and therefore suggests that because 
bureaucratic decisions are usually routinized and made without reference to race 
or class, there should be no systematic pattern to service delivery inequalities (e.g. 
Mladenka, 1989). Over three decades of empirical research among urban scholars, 
mostly in the United States, generally lent support to the bureaucratic hypothesis 
(Meier, Stewart, & England, 1991), with some notably rare exceptions (e.g. Koehler 
& Wrightson, 1987). Recent methodological advancements in Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) and spatial analysis (Miyake, Maroko, Grady, Maantay, 
& Arno, 2011; e.g. Talen & Anselin, 1998) have done little to dislodge the 
conclusion among scholars of urban policy that the spatial distribution of service 
provision demonstrates ‘unpatterned inequality’ (Lineberry, 1977, p. 142), 
especially with respect to fixed infrastructure such as urban parks which cannot 
easily be relocated (Lineberry, 1977; Pallas & Jennings, 2010). This literature has 
suffered, however, from an urban American bias and a relative disconnection from 
the vast body of geographic studies of accessibility discussed above. 
In this paper we seek to advance the state of the literature examining the 
political and bureaucratic hypotheses using a novel research design that 
demonstrates that these two hypotheses and the dynamics they describe may in 
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some cases be complementary rather than competitive. That is, we advance the 
thesis that the application of a bureaucratic set of decision rules may still result in 
racially-patterned service accessibility. 
2. Background 
Remote Australia is qualitatively different from much of the rest of Australia 
(Holmes, 1981). Remote Australia, as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) Remoteness Structure, accounts for the more than 85 per cent of the 
national landmass that is located at a great distance to major centers of industry 
and commerce. It is characterized by a physical environment that is generally 
unattractive for agricultural activity aside from low-density rangeland pastoralism. 
In consequence, remote Australia is sparsely populated, inhabited by only 2.3 per 
cent of the Australian population, with a mean population density of just 1 person 
per 13.5 km. Land use in this sparsely populated region is undergoing a 
multifunctional transition from pastoralism towards conservation, Indigenous and 
resource-extractive uses (Holmes, 2008). Although ownership of Australia was 
violently appropriated from its Indigenous people by the British Crown, land rights 
legislation and judicial decisions since 1966 have resulted in Indigenous ownership 
of 22 per cent of the Australian landmass being restored or recognized, almost all of 
which is located in remote parts of the country (Altman & Markham, 2015).  
The Northern Territory is perhaps the most remote jurisdiction in continental 
Australia, with a population of just 231,000 in 2011, the majority of whom live in 
the capital Darwin (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Outside of Darwin, just 
102,000 people occupy a remote hinterland of 1,345,000 km2. Over half of this 
remote population is Indigenous, mostly living in so-called ‘discrete Indigenous 
communities’ on land owned by formally-incorporated Aboriginal entities. These 
discrete communities, established due to Aboriginal social agitation for land rights 
and self-determination in the 1970s and 1980s, have enabled some Aboriginal 
people to move back to land from which they had been dispossessed. Remote 
communities now form a key part of remote Australia’s settlement structure 
(Holmes, 1988), especially in the NT. In 2006, an estimated 63 per cent of the 
remote Indigenous population lived in 1,112 discrete Indigenous communities.1 
These small settlements range from tiny ‘homelands’ populated by a handful of 
residents to larger remote towns of several thousand (see Figure 1). Discrete 
Indigenous communities usually occupied by Indigenous residents and a small 
minority of transient non-Indigenous staff.  
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Figure 1 Northern Territory housing communities and growth towns. 
 
Australia’s remote discrete Indigenous communities are characterized by their 
relative inaccessibility and their distinctive economy, with a persistent customary 
economy, relatively little access to private-sector labor markets and encapsulation 
within a federal welfare state (Altman, 2001). In general, physical access to services 
is an acute problem for Indigenous residents of remote areas, with a nationally 
representative survey of Indigenous Australians finding that not only are basic 
facilities such as dentists and hospitals more difficult to access in remote areas 
than non-remote areas but also that access barriers in remote areas are more 
frequently related to physical access rather than other issues such as cost barriers 
or waiting times (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010).  
These spatial factors and on-going settler colonialism combine to produce a 
range of negative economic, health and educational outcomes in remote 
communities. In conventional economic terms, Indigenous poverty levels are high. 
Around 48% of Indigenous families in remote Australia live below the poverty line, 
although there is a significant association between Indigenous poverty and 
remoteness only for couples (36%; Hunter, 2012). These economic data should be 
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considered with caution, however, as recorded incomes may be supplemented by 
non-market activities in remote areas (Altman, 2001). While for Indigenous 
Australians, the associations between health outcomes and remoteness vary 
according to health condition (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014b), 
accessibility of primary health services is far poorer in remote communities 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014a).  While educational accessibility 
decreases with remoteness (Haberkorn & Bamford, 2000), educational achievement 
decreases dramatically with remoteness even for primary school children 
(Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 
2013), the age at which the accessibility gradient is flattest. 
Since 2005 both the federal and Northern Territory governments have 
reoriented their remote service delivery policies to focus on centralization. While 
centralization policies in remote Indigenous Australia hark back to the colonial-era 
forced sedentarization of nomadic hunter-gatherer people (e.g. Rowse, 1998), the 
current neocolonial centralization strategy in remote Indigenous Australia is 
couched in economic terms. Remote communities are described as economically 
‘unviable’ (Altman, 2009; Moran, 2010), with their populations considered by one 
recent government review to be an impediment to the development of Northern 
Australia (Joint Select Committee on Northern Australia, 2014). Framing the 
residents of remote communities as welfare mendicants, the policy injunction of the 
state has been described by one observer as ‘Transform the bush, rationalise, 
reorder!’ (Rothwell, 2014). 
Housing provision has been at the forefront of the rollout of centralization 
policies. Housing may have been selected as the initial policy locus because 
housing investments are long-term. Thus, by centralizing housing provision, path 
dependent concentration of other services is likely to follow. Following the abolition 
of the Indigenous representative body with a responsibility for service delivery in 
2004 and the so-called ‘mainstreaming’ of responsibility for remote housing 
provision in the NT to a federal government department, a review of remote 
Indigenous housing provision recommended an overhaul of the funding system. 
Responsibility for remote housing was devolved the NT under a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed by the NT and federal governments (Australian 
Government & Northern Territory Government, 2007).  The MoU asserted that new 
housing was to be prioritized for ‘main urban centers and larger/strategically 
placed growth communities… to meet existing demand and future growth’ while in 
‘smaller communities… new housing [is] to be negotiated and agreed on a case-by-
case basis.’ In outstations, the smallest remote Indigenous settlements, no new 
housing was to be funded. While MoU did not precisely specify what was meant by 
‘larger/strategically placed growth communities’, fifteen communities in the NT 
were identified for the receipt of new housing (Auditor-General for the Northern 
Territory, 2010). While the federal partially resumed responsibility for new housing 
development later that year as part of a federal ‘Intervention’ into remote 
Indigenous communities in the NT (see Altman & Hinkson, 2007), the selection of 
growth communities was retained. 
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The centralization strategy pioneered in the NT was expanded to encompass a 
hub-and-spoke model for service delivery and extend across much of the rest of 
remote Australia as part of the agenda-setting ‘Closing the Gap’ National 
Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery (Council of Australian 
Governments, 2009). In April 2009, Australian governments at state and federal 
levels agreed to prioritize the delivery of housing and selected social services to a 
further 14 communities outside the NT, bringing the number of so-called ‘priority 
communities’ to 29 nationally (Macklin, 2009). Residents of other communities 
would either have to do without infrastructure, or resort to migration or temporary 
mobility to access services (Moran, 2010).  The non-NT communities were 
reportedly selected on the basis of the following four criteria (Macklin, 2009): 
 Significant concentration of population; 
 Anticipated demographic trends and pressures; 
 The potential for economic development and employment; and 
 The extent of pre-existing shortfalls in government investment in 
infrastructure and services. 
 
The process by which these criteria were selected and their sometimes competing 
multiple criteria were balanced in order to select priority communities is unclear 
from the public record.  
In May 2009, the NT government followed suit and announced that it would 
reorient its remote service delivery and regional development policies around the 
creation of 20 service hubs (Northern Territory Government, 2009). Once again, the 
15 communities prioritized for housing were built upon, with the inclusion of a 
further 5 communities within the NT. New infrastructure and service spending 
would be prioritized in these new ‘Growth Towns’ as they were initially designated.  
Implicit in the allocation of service hubs was the expectation that service 
centralization would result in population growth via migration from communities in 
their hinterland (Taylor, 2009). Indeed, preliminary research suggests that service 
hub communities are relatively ‘sticky’ in terms of their ability to attract migrants 
from neighboring remote areas and to retain existing residents when compared to 
similar non-hub remote communities (Biddle & Markham, 2013). Such stickiness 
may be a result of their relatively higher levels of housing and service provision. 
Nevertheless, it should be clear that these migration outcomes associated with 
service hubs do not equate to a successful ‘growth pole’ regional development 
strategy (Parr, 1999) but rather centralization through the diversion of a small 
portion of the flow of outbound migrants in remote areas. 
The authors are not aware of any specific services being closed in non-hub 
communities in the Northern Territory as a result of the centralization policy.  A 
recent government-commissioned review suggested the closure of remote secondary 
schools, to be replaced with a centralized system of boarding schools (Wilson, 
2014), although this policy has not been implemented to date. As with housing, 
however, there is an historic undersupply of health and education services in most 
remote communities.  The priority-community policy, which funnels resources to 
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hub communities, is likely to result in poorer outcomes in non-hub communities 
which do not receive much needed investments in service provision.  
The neighboring jurisdiction of Western Australia, however, has 
foreshadowed a radical program of closures. While this de facto commenced with 
the closure of services such as schools and health services in several non-‘priority’ 
communities (e.g. school closures in Patjarr: Ward, 2010), this policy has 
progressed to the closure of entire communities. One remote community, 
Oombulgurri, was recently closed after services were removed (Herbert, 2011), and 
its remaining inhabitants forced to leave (Vidot, 2014). Similar closures are 
reportedly planned for a further 150 communities (Herbert, 2014).  
3. Research approach 
While the rationalization of remote service delivery may be worthy of critique for 
normative reasons (Altman, 2009; Moran, 2010), this paper has different aims. 
From an applied perspective, this paper seeks to describe the geography of the 
service hubs in the Northern Territory and its relationship to spatial and racial 
inequalities through a series of four analyses.  First, the current system of service 
hubs is described, showing which locations are most adversely affected in terms of 
travel time to nearest hub. Second, a rule-driven location-allocation analysis is 
used to generate a hypothetical system of service hubs that minimizes overall travel 
time to nearest service hub. Third, the actual and optimized systems of service 
hubs are compared, showing which areas are relatively well or poorly served by the 
current system of hubs. Finally, the current system of hubs, the optimized system 
of hubs, and the differences between the two systems are compared to the 
Indigenous population distribution to test for the existence of racially patterned or 
unpatterned inequality. 
These analyses also inform a theoretical inquiry. Specifically, this paper 
seeks to reconcile two seemingly contradictory hypotheses regarding service 
distribution, the political hypothesis and the bureaucratic hypothesis, and show 
that they may in certain circumstances be complementary.  The first analysis 
shows the existence of spatial inequalities in service provision under the current 
system of hubs. However, the conclusions that can be drawn about the causes of 
spatial inequalities are limited. Consequently, we augment this with the location-
allocation analysis, which simulates a rule-driven, racially-blind allocation process 
consistent with the bureaucratic hypothesis. By comparing both these systems of 
hubs with the distribution of the Indigenous population, we demonstrate that both 
the actual system of hubs and the hypothetical rule-driven system of hubs 
discriminate against Indigenous people. We argue that this is because the 
imposition of any system of hubs is discriminatory, given the population geography 
of the Northern Territory. Therefore, we suggest that the decision to implement any 
centralization policy is consistent with the political hypothesis of racially 
discriminatory decision making, even if implemented with a bureaucratic 
rationality. We conclude that these apparently contradictory positions may co-exist, 
with political considerations operating at one spatial and regulatory scale and 
bureaucratic processes dominating at another scale.  
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4. Methods and materials 
4.1 Travel time and service hub catchment estimation 
Travel time to the current service hub was estimated using a Geographic 
Information System (GIS). The residential locations of the NT population – or 
population origins - were approximated using the centroids of ABS Mesh Blocks for 
2011. Mesh blocks are the smallest spatial unit at which the ABS release 
population counts, with a median residential population count of 48 (IQR = 0 – 
103). Because the population counts released at mesh block level are not 
disaggregated by Indigenous status and do not adjust for census undercount, mesh 
block populations were estimated by the authors by pro-rating the state-wide 
estimated residential population using NT-specific undercount factors adjusted for 
Indigenous status, five year age bracket and sex (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2012). As a consequence of the NT’s population sparsity, some populated remote 
Mesh Blocks are very large (the largest decile of populated NT Mesh Blocks range in 
size from 12 km2 to 70,406 km2), rendering centroid locations somewhat arbitrary 
origin points. In order to mitigate the effect of this instance of the Modifiable Areal 
Unit Problem (Hayward, 2009), the 639 discrete Indigenous communities in the NT 
as reported in the 2006 Community Housing and Infrastructure Needs Survey or 
CHINS (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007) were used instead of centroids as 
origin points in Mesh Blocks containing at least one community. When multiple 
CHINS communities were enveloped within a single Mesh Block, all communities 
were retained and the Mesh Block population estimate was pro-rated between them 
according to their 2006 populations. 
Catchments of service hubs were estimated by finding the nearest service 
hub for each origin point, where service hubs included the NT’s five major urban 
centers, the fifteen Housing Communities and six additional Growth Towns. 
Distance between origin points and service hubs was calculated using travel time 
driving at the speed limit along the road network, using a national road network 
dataset (StreetPro Australia, 2012). In order to include island populations in this 
model, public air transit and ferry services were included, using routes and 
timetables published on the internet or collected by telephone in February 2013. 
Travel time by airplane or ferry was calculated by summing actual transit time and 
the mean wait for a service between the hours 6:00 AM and 10:00 PM. 
In order to capture cross-border servicing of NT residents, urban centers 
with a population of 5,000 or more in adjacent states were included in the model. 
This is important, as anecdotal accounts suggest that NT residents may access 
services in towns in WA, QLD and SA (most importantly Kununurra and Mount 
Isa). Because this paper is concerned with the accessibility of services for NT 
residents, residents of neighboring states who may access services in the NT were 
excluded from the analysis.  
Travel time to nearest service hub was then estimated as a continuous 
surface across the state for cartographic purposes, using a travel time of 60 
km/hour off the road network. 
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4.2 Location-allocation analysis of service hubs 
In order to assess the efficiency of the currently selected system of service hubs, 
the current system was compared with a hypothetical system of service hubs in 
which travel time is minimized. A location-allocation analysis was undertaken to 
identify this optimal system of reallocated service hubs. More specifically, the solver 
sought to minimize aggregate travel time in a p-medians problem, where all 
settlements in the NT with a population of 200 or more were considered candidate 
service hubs under the constraint that existing major urban centers in the NT and 
beyond its borders (i.e. towns with a population of 5,000 or more) always be 
selected as service hubs. Communities were weighted by population. Origin points 
were weighted by estimated residential population. In order to maintain 
consistency with the current system of service hubs, the number of service hubs to 
select was fixed at 21. Because the number of potential systems of hubs is too large 
to exhaustively evaluate each possible combination, a heuristic approach (Teitz & 
Bart, 1968) combined with Hillsman editing (1984) was used in ArcGIS 10.1. 
Catchments in the optimized system of hubs were calculated and mapped 
using the same method as used for the current system of hubs. To estimate and 
locate the inefficiencies in the current system of hubs, the difference in travel times 
between the existing system of hubs and the hypothetical, optimized system was 
then calculated and mapped. These differences were summarized at the regional 
level using the ABS Indigenous Region statistical geography (see Figure 2), with the 
differences in mean travel time between the two systems of hubs estimated using 
linear regression for each Indigenous Region. 
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Figure 2 ABS Indigenous regions and settlements in the Northern Territory. 
 
4.3 Testing unpatterned inequality  
In order to test the unpatterned inequality hypothesis, a group who might be 
discriminated against in the allocation of urban services must be identified. This 
paper tests the hypothesis that Indigenous residents of the non-urban NT receive a 
lower level of service accessibility than their non-Indigenous counterparts. To do 
so, three multivariate regression analyses of travel time are conducted from origin 
points to nearest hub. In Model 1, the travel time to nearest hub in the current 
system of hubs was used as the dependent variable. The proportion of residents 
who identified in the 2011 census as Indigenous (at the SA1 level) was an 
independent variable to test for a systematic difference between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous NT residents. Settlement size was included as a covariate to 
account for the possibility that settlement size (W. Sanders, 2010) as well as 
Indigenous status was determinative of travel time. Origin points were weighted by 
their estimated residential population. Outlier origin points with very large travel 
times (due to being isolated on islands) were excluded from this analysis as they 
artificially inflated model fit results, but their exclusion did not impact on the sign 
or significance of coefficient estimates. 
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It is possible that Indigenous residents of the NT must travel for longer to 
reach a service hub than non-Indigenous residents because they live further from 
major urban centers. To test if this was the case, a second regression analysis 
(Model 2) was conducted using travel time to nearest service hub in the optimized 
system of service hubs as the dependent variable and the same independent 
variables. Finally, to account for this potential effect, the analysis was repeated 
using the difference in travel time between the two systems of hubs as the 
independent variable.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Current service hub catchments and travel time 
A substantial heterogeneity in both the travel time to service hubs and their 
populations is evident. Darwin, the NT’s capital and largest settlement also has the 
largest catchment (see Error! Reference source not found.). It is the major center 
or growth town for over 21,700 people. Katherine, Alice Springs and Ali Curung 
have the next largest catchments, being the closest service hub for over 6,100, 
4,800 and 2,800 people respectively. Hermannsburg, Papunya and Ali Curung have 
the most dispersed service catchments, with a mean travel time for those in the 
catchment of 2:13, 2:01 and 1:32 respectively. When these travel times are mapped 
(see Error! Reference source not found.), it is evident that accessibility to service 
hubs in lowest in the southern part of the state, although some island settlements 
in the north such as Warruwi and Minjilang also suffer from low access to service 
hubs. 
5.2 Optimized service hub catchments and travel time 
The optimized service hub system retained most of the current service hubs (see 
Figure 4). Towns that lost their hub status were Ali Curung, Daguragu – Kalkarinji, 
Elliot, Numbulwar, Papunya, Umbakumba and Yirrkala. In the cases of 
Umbakumba and Yirrkala, their deselection was due to the proximity of other 
service hubs at Angurugu and Nhulunbuy, while in the other cases deselection was 
likely due to a more systemic realignment. Current non-hub towns that were 
selected as service hubs were Ampilatwatja, Minjilang, Ti Tree, Walungurru, 
Warruwi, Yarralin and Yulara. In the cases Minjilang and Warruwi, their island 
status means that air travel is the only available mode of transport to any service 
hub. Therefore, despite their relatively small town and catchment populations (see 
Error! Reference source not found.) their contribution to total travel time to hubs 
still contributed significantly to the state total. 
In this optimized system of hubs, travel time to the nearest hub remains 
highly uneven (see Figure 4). Large areas of very low accessibility would still be 
found in the far southeast of the state, in addition to pockets of low accessibility in 
the Tanami desert, the Gulf of Carpentaria and Arnhem Land. 
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Table 1 Major urban centre, housing community and growth town catchments and 
travel times by service hub. 
 
Current system of hubs  Optimised system of hubs 
Settlement 
Mean 
travel 
time 
Max 
travel 
time 
Town 
Population 
Catchment 
population 
 Mean 
travel 
time 
Max 
travel 
time 
Town 
Population 
Catchment 
population 
Ali Curung 1:32 3:25 645 2,898  - - - - 
Alice Springs 0:14 3:46 26,206 4,824  0:11 3:46 26,206 4,301 
Ampilatwatja - - - -  1:11 3:14 436 2,129 
Angurugu 0:11 1:11 1,003 1,468  0:15 1:11 1,003 2,021 
Borroloola 0:35 4:06 1,107 954  0:35 4:06 1,107 954 
Daguragu 0:57 2:44 641 730  - - - - 
Darwin 0:22 19:38 110,074 21,713  0:15 2:11 110,074 20,826 
Elliott 0:21 3:15 406 192  - - - - 
Galiwinku 0:03 0:29 2,549 219  0:03 0:29 2,549 219 
Gapuwiyak 0:44 2:28 1,055 1,083  0:44 2:28 1,055 1,083 
Gunbalanya 0:25 2:12 1,404 1,704  0:25 2:12 1,404 1,704 
Hermannsburg 2:13 6:33 746 2,003  0:51 2:33 746 1,595 
Katherine 0:20 4:20 6,520 6,120  0:19 2:44 6,520 6,087 
Lajamanu 0:07 3:17 760 37  0:40 3:17 760 752 
Maningrida 0:07 1:17 2,752 424  0:07 1:17 2,752 424 
Milingimbi 0:01 0:03 1,296 42  0:01 0:03 1,296 42 
Minjilang - - - -  0:02 0:33 369 5 
Ngukurr 0:36 2:10 1,260 823  0:52 4:09 1,260 1,634 
Nhulunbuy 0:02 0:08 4,260 172  0:07 2:15 4,260 1,365 
Numbulwar 0:01 1:16 807 1  - - - - 
Papunya 2:01 6:04 496 1,477  - - - - 
Ramingining 0:28 2:49 1,057 588  0:28 2:49 1,057 588 
Tennant Creek 0:12 3:15 3,354 416  0:34 3:18 3,354 1,180 
Ti Tree - - - -  0:54 2:54 143 1,439 
Umbakumba 0:02 0:37 540 13  - - - - 
Wadeye 0:31 2:25 2,547 1,832  0:31 2:25 2,547 1,832 
Walungurru - - - -  0:35 2:05 538 210 
Warruwi - - - -  0:01 0:01 514 0 
Wurrumiyanga 0:15 1:08 1,875 1,224  0:15 1:08 1,875 1,224 
Yarralin - - - -  1:02 3:52 314 755 
Yirrkala 0:14 2:10 1,017 175  - - - - 
Yuendumu 1:16 3:45 816 1356  0:56 3:45 816 755 
Yulara - - - -  0:53 2:45 860 1,043 
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5.3 Comparison of current and optimized service hubs 
If the current system of service hub were replaced with the optimized system, the 
landscape of travel time to the nearest hub would be substantially changed (see 
Figure 5). Total mean travel can be reduced from 25 minutes to 19 minutes. The 
most extreme example of this is in Minjilang and Warruwi, where currently 
residents must catch a light airplane to Darwin to access a service hub. On the 
other hand, in the towns of Darwin and Alice Springs almost no change in travel 
time is observed.  
Beyond these outlying islands substantial scope to reduce aggregate travel 
time remains. Even if Minjilang and Warruwi and the large urban centers of Darwin 
and Alice Springs are removed from the analysis, the optimization of service hub 
allocations reduces mean travel time for the remaining 70,000 NT residents from 
37 to 31 minutes. In Numbulwar and its hinterland travel time would be increased, 
with the closest service center now being Ngukurr. The relocation of a hub from 
Daguragu-Kalkarindji to Yarralin moved the location of an accessible region from 
the former to the latter, while residents of Elliot and its hinterland would suffer 
reduced hub accessibility, needing to travel to Tennant Creek to access their 
closest service hub. While residents of Ali Curung and its immediate hinterland  
 
Figure 3 Travel time to nearest NT Housing Community or Growth Town.  
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would also have reduced accessibility of service hubs, a much larger surrounding 
region would have increased access to service hubs. The largest region of increased 
accessibility would be in the south-west of the state, with residents of the large 
triangular region from Walungurru to Kaltukatjara and Yulara having much 
improved access to service hubs.  
At the Indigenous Region level, the difference in travel time between the two 
systems of hubs is substantial in specific locations (see Table 1). For example, in 
the Alice Springs, Darwin, and Jabiru – Tiwi (excluding Minjilang and Warruwi) 
regions there was no change in travel time. In the Katherine, Nhulunbuy and 
Tennant Creek regions there were minor but statistically insignificant decreases in 
travel time, while in Minjilang and Warruwi and Apatula there were substantial and 
significant decreases in travel time.  
Despite these decreases, substantial variation in average travel time to the 
nearest hub remained at the regional level after optimizing service hub location. 
While average travel time to the nearest hub in Apatula and Tennant Creek was 
almost one hour, in the Nhulunbuy region it was just fifteen minutes.  
 
Figure 4 Travel time to optimal service hubs. 
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5.4 Patterned or unpatterned inequality 
Multiple regression of travel time to nearest hub against per cent Indigenous and 
settlement size revealed small but statistically significant associations with both 
covariates in both systems of hubs (see Table 3). For both the current system of 
hubs (Model 1) and the optimized system of hubs (Model 2), for every 10 per cent of 
the population that is Indigenous, estimated travel time increased by 3 minutes. 
Conversely, as the population of a settlement increased by 1,000 persons, travel 
time to the nearest hub decreased by 36-37 minutes. Neither of these factors  
predicted the difference in travel time that could be saved by reallocating service 
hubs (Model 3). As such, our results support hypothesis 2, that while unpatterned 
inequality may characterize the selection of particular hubs, the introduction of an 
efficient system of hubs is itself discriminatory. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The development of a system of service hubs entails the creation of significant 
spatial inequality in access to services. While this is most extreme for residents of 
islands who must use air or sea transport to access a service hub, substantial 
variations in accessibility remain even on the mainland. For example, while some 
 
Figure 5 Difference in travel time between current system of hubs and optimized 
system of hubs. 
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Table 1 Mean and maximum travel time to nearest hub by region of origin. 
 
Mean travel time  
 
Maximum travel time  
 Indigenous region Current 
system of 
hubs 
Optimised 
system of 
hubs 
p  Current 
system of 
hubs 
Optimised 
system of 
hubs 
Population 
Alice Springs 0:06 0:06  
1  
0:12 0:12 27,313  
Apatula 1:40 0:52 
<0.001  
6:33 4:27 12,662  
Darwin 0:15 0:15 
1  
2:07 2:07 130,379  
Jabiru – Tiwi 
(excluding Minjiland 
and Warruwi) 
0:24 0:24 1 
 
2:25 2:25 14,983  
Katherine 0:28 0:28 
0.845  
4:20 4:09 19,336  
Minjilang and 
Warruwi 18:48 0:01  <0.001 
 
19:38 0:33 999  
Nhulunbuy 0:09 0:15 
0.098  
2:28 2:28 16,930  
Tennant Creek 0:39 0:59 
0.058  
4:34 4:34 6,466  
All 0:25 0:19 
<0.001  
19:38 4:27 229,068 
P values were estimated by ordinary least squares for each Indigenous region, comparing the mean 
travel times in the current system of hubs with the optimised system of hubs. A p value of exactly 1 
implies no change in travel times within that region. 
 
 
Table 2 Association between Indigenous status and travel time. 
 Model 1 
Minutes to nearest  
current hub 
Model 2 
Minutes to nearest  
optimised hub 
Model 3 
Minutes saved by 
reallocating hubs 
Constant 47.7 (41.3, 54.0) *** 39.3 (34.9, 43.7) *** 8.5 (2.8, 13.9) ** 
Per cent Indigenous 0.3 (0.2, 0.4) *** 0.3 (0.2, 0.4) *** -0.0 (-0.1, 0.0) 
Settlement size (‘000s) -36.8 (-42.7, -30.9) *** -36.0 (-40.1, -31.9) *** -0.9 (-6.1, 4.4) 
R2 0.15 0.25 0.00 
Notes: Residents of the five major urban centres were excluded from this analysis. 95% confidence 
intervals in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 0.001 level, ** indicates significance at the 
0.01 level, * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.   
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residents in the far south west of the state are more than four and a half hours 
from a service hub, those living in mainland Arnhem Land are all within two and a 
half hours of the nearest service hub.  Residents of major centers such as Darwin 
or Alice Springs need travel only within the town itself to access services. The 
current system of service hubs has imposed a gradient of accessibility across 
settlements in the Northern Territory. In towns unfortunate enough to be located at 
the terminus of a very long ‘spoke’, significant investment in public transport may 
be required as a starting point to mitigate this relative disadvantage. Central 
Australia, particularly the Utopia region and Western Desert are currently 
particularly poorly served, as are the island communities of Minjilang and Warruwi. 
Given the associations in the geographic literature between service accessibility and 
health and educational outcomes, we might expect residents of those areas which 
are poorly provisioned to do relatively worse. Our analysis suggests that attention 
to service accessibility in these locations may be warranted. 
Furthermore, while any hub-and-spoke system will always produce some 
relatively inaccessible localities, it is important to note that the current system of 
hubs as whole is highly inefficient in terms of the aggregate travel time required for 
all residents to access their closest service hub. The reorganization of service hubs 
could reduce aggregate travel time by over 15% in remote areas, even when 
excluding remote islands.  As such, this analysis demonstrates once again the 
potential for spatially-enabled governance to deliver superior outcomes (Hugo, 
2001). We would expect service use to increase relative to the current system under 
such a reorganization, and as such, health and education outcomes to improve. 
However, relative to universal service provision in all communities, we would still 
expect to see a relative decline in outcomes.   
When the Indigenous status of residents is compared with travel time to nearest 
hub, three results are found (see Table 3). First, travel time to nearest hub is 
greater in areas with a greater proportion of Indigenous residents. Second, this 
racially-patterned inequality is repeated in the optimized system of hubs, created 
by following racially-blind location-allocation analysis. Third, the difference in 
travel times between these two systems of hubs is not correlated with the 
Indigeneity of residents.  
These important findings are worth repeating: while the current system of hubs 
is discriminatory, so too is a system created following the kind of decision rules 
suggested by the bureaucratic hypothesis. Yet this kind of patterned inequality is 
precisely what the bureaucratic hypothesis predicts should not exist.  How is 
racially-patterned inequality created by following bureaucratic decision rules to be 
understood? 
We suggest that in this specific instance, the apparent contradiction explained 
by the Indigenous population geography of the Northern Territory. Indigenous 
people in the Northern Territory are more likely to live in more remote, sparsely 
populated areas. These are precisely the areas that are most difficult to service 
equitably with a hub-and-spoke model. Any centralization strategy in this 
geographic context is in practice racially discriminatory, even if hubs are selected 
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via a racially-blind decision process. Indeed, given that this centralization strategy 
is specific in its application to remote Indigenous communities (Rothwell, 2014), it 
can be argued that the overall policy of centralization and its spatial extent are 
themselves discriminatory. As such, one prominent commentator has described the 
centralization of services for Indigenous communities as an ‘infrastructure 
apartheid system’ (Mundine in Karvelas & Taylor, 2014). The designation of 
‘priority communities’ for service delivery is not in fact an effort to close the gap in 
socio-economic outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians but 
is instead revealed as a neocolonial policy of racially-discriminatory population 
management, justified with recourse to economic efficiency and implemented 
through rational bureaucratic processes. 
More generally, politically discriminatory decisions can be implemented in a 
racially-blind, rational manner that leads to racially discriminatory outcomes.  As 
the case of centralization in the Northern Territory shows, there is not necessarily a 
contradiction between the bureaucratic and political hypotheses regarding service 
inequality. Rational, racially-blind logics can create discriminatory outcomes when 
put in service to racially discriminatory policies. 
 
Notes 
1 This should be considered an approximation only, as the numerator population is 
sourced from ABS CHINS while the denominator comes from the ABS ERP. 
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